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Abstract
For a zero-sum stochastic game which does not satisfy the Isaacs condition, we provide a value
function representation for an Isaacs-type equation whose Hamiltonian lies in between the lower
and upper Hamiltonians, as a convex combination of the two. For the general case (i.e. the convex
combination is time and state dependent) our representation amounts to a random change of the
rules of the game, to allow each player at any moment to see the other player’s action or not,
according to a coin toss with probabilities of heads and tails given by the convex combination
appearing in the PDE. If the combination is state independent, then the rules can be set all in
advance, in a deterministic way. This means that tossing the coin along the game, or tossing it
repeatedly right at the beginning leads to the same value. The representations are asymptotic, over
time discretizations. Space discretization is possible as well, leading to similar results.
Keywords: stochastic games, asymptotic Perron’s method, Markov strategies, viscosity solutions,
discretization.
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010): 91A05, 91A15, 49L20, 49L25
1 Introduction
Zero-sum stochastic games of the type
sup
u
inf
v
E[g(Xs,x;u,vT )], infv
sup
u
E[g(Xs,x;u,vT )], (1)
where the state system is controlled by two opponents u and v as{
dXt = b(t,Xt, ut, vt)dt+ σ(t,Xt, ut, vt)dWt,
Xs = x ∈ R
d,
(2)
have been studied extensively. We recall quickly that the above game is set so that player v pays
g(x) to the player u at terminal time T , if the state sits at x at time t = T . We mention just a
few representative pieces of work on such zero-sum differential games: the seminal work of Isaacs on
deterministic games [Isa65], some of the early work on stochastic games like [Ell76], and the extensive
contribution of the Ekaterinburg school of games (mostly deterministic and some stochastic) presented
in the monograph [KS88]. The list is much larger and we do not claim to cover it here.
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It is well known that a (heuristic) dynamic programming approach to such zero sum games leads
to the so-called Isaacs equations:{
−vt −H
i(t, x, vx, vxx) = 0 on [0, T ) × R
d,
v(T, ·) = g(·), on Rd,
(3)
where
H−(t, x, p,M) , sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
[
b(t, x, u, v) · p+
1
2
Tr
(
σ(t, x, u, v)σ(t, x, u, v)TM
)]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x ∈ Rd,
(4)
H+(t, x, p,M) , inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
[
b(t, x, u, v) · p+
1
2
Tr
(
σ(t, x, u, v)σ(t, x, u, v)TM
)]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x ∈ Rd.
(5)
For i = − we call it the lower Isaacs equation, and for i = + we call it the upper Isaacs equation.
The precise definition of the games varies in the literature (as there is no canonical model), from the
Elliott-Kalton formulation in [FS89] to the feedback formulation in [KS88] which is used in similar
ways in [FHH11], [FHH12], [S1ˆ4] or [S1ˆ5]. However, in any of these formulations, the intuition behind
the (solution of the) lower equation is that player v has informational priority over u . By informational
priority we mean that v can see, in real time, the action of u before choosing his/her own action v.
The upper Isaacs equation has, obviously, the exact opposite meaning. If the so-called Isaacs condition
holds, i.e.
H− = H+ , H,
it does not matter who has informational priority. Even if both players can (symmetrically) only
observe the state and nothing else, the game still have a value (see [S1ˆ4]).
The main goal of the present paper is to provide a meaningful interpretation/representation for
the (unique viscosity) solution of the equation{
−vt −H
p(t, x, vx, vxx) = 0 on [0, T )× R
d,
v(T, ·) = g(·), on Rd,
(6)
where
Hp(t, x, p,M) = p(t, x)H−(t, x, p,M) + (1− p(t, x))H+(t, x, p,M),
for some fixed p : [0, T ]× Rd → [0, 1]. Such representation should naturally come as a value obtained
from playing the formal game (1)-(2). This means that we are looking for a model of rules of the
game and strategies such that the resulting game has a value and the value is equal to the solution of
(6). In order to model the strategies of the players we follow here the line of work [KS88], [FHH11],
[FHH12], [S1ˆ4] or [S1ˆ5] that uses feedback strategies, rather than the idea of Elliott-Kalton strategies
in [EK72], [FS89].
The Rules of the Game: in words, the (heuristic) rules of a game with value vp are
1. feedback strategies: at each time t, both players observe the full past of the state X|[0,t] ,
2. randomization: at each such time t, if the state sits atXt = x a coin is tossed, with probabilities
P(H) = p(t, x), P(T ) = 1− p(t, x),
3. priority rule: if the coin turns H, then at that particular time, v sees u first,in real time. If
the coin turns T , then u sees v.
Remark 1.1 Formally, if the Isaacs equation (6) has a smooth solution vp, playing a continuous-time
game with value vp is nothing else then a ”local game” over (u, v) (that should result in the value vp).
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Remark 1.1, as well as the heuristic rules of the game described above, are all justified by the very
simple one-period observation in Subsection 1.1 below. The rest of the paper is dedicated to putting
the game with such rules on sound theoretical foundation, and proving the (asymptotic) value property.
When the coin toss does not depend on the state, we actually have a deterministic approximation,
in the spirit of [KS05]. The heuristic connection between the two cases, the random rule of priority
or the (quick) deterministic change for the rule of priority, fits in the well known narrative where, in
a continuous-time problem, one can basically simulate randomization from the realization of a single
path. Since the technical proofs for the deterministic case are a little bit more involved, we present
this result (and its proof) first.
Technically, the proofs are mainly based on a modification of Perron’s method introduced in [S1ˆ5].
It should be noted that while Perron scheme is related to the monotone scheme of [BS91] (related
in turn to the method of relaxed semi-limits of [BP87]), the version of Perron used here is based on
probabilistic arguments.
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper studying a similar representation problem so far
is the work [KS05], for deterministic games. For the case when the problem is autonomous with
respect to time and p is a constant (probability) they use a Trotter-Kato approximation idea to show
the following: if one denotes by S−(t) and S+(t) the non-linear (Nisio-type, see [Nis88]) semigroups
associated with the two games, i.e. v−(t, ·) = S−(T − t)g and v+(t, ·) = S+(T − t)g are (the viscosity)
solutions of the two Isaacs equations (3) for i = − and i = + given by [FS89], then we have the
(analytic) result
vp(t, ·) = lim
n→∞
(
S−(p(T − t)/n)S+(p(T − t)/n)
)n
g. (7)
The right-hand side above might be interpreted as a time-discretized game, but the precise definition
of a game with such a value is actually not necessarily possible. Therefore, the result is mostly an
analytical asymptotic representation. In addition, the semigroups S− and S+ are constructed in [FS89]
using non-symmetric games which play Elliott-Kalton strategies vs. open-loop controls, introduced
for the deterministic framework in [EK72]. As observed in [S1ˆ5][Remark 2.1], these definitions do not
always have the genuine meaning of some values of non symmetric games. This is why it may not be
possible to rewrite the right-hand-side in (7) as an inf/sup or sup/inf.
While our work below in Subsection 2.1 is, obviously, related to [KS05], it does not really overlap,
either conceptually or technically. To begin with, for us vp is a limit of a genuine (sup/inf or inf/sup)
value of a game, discretized over time (compare to the comments above). Our state system is time
dependent, and, more importantly, we allow for the probability p to be non-constant. The time
discretization we use is different, as we do not allow for actions to be changed in between the times on
the grid, and the time grid does not have to be as in [KS05] but only satisfy what we call an asymptotic
density property. This relates to the possibility of randomization of rules (as in the general Subsection
2.2) but where randomization of rules is performed in advance.
Most importantly, our most general result in Subsection 2.2 provides a completely different con-
ceptual point of view, as a game with random rules, were a time and state dependent coin is tossed to
decide which player has priority. Such a result, even at a formal level, does not exist in the literature,
to the best of our knowledge, even in the deterministic case.
Technically, our work (both parts) is rather different from [KS05], being based on a Perron scheme
introduced in [S1ˆ5]. One of the benefits is that we do not need to assume any prior results from the
theory of zero-sum games (the results in [FS89] are used in [KS05]), but we can build the whole model
and perform the analysis in a self-contained way.
1.1 One-period games with random rules
In the general case of Subsection 2.2, our dynamic game will be played using locally a simple idea
that is best explained in one-period. This is easy enough so that genuine proofs are unnecessary. The
notation u, v for the actions of the players overlaps with the dynamic case, but this is on purpose, to
facilitate the presentation.
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Assume we have a (bounded) function f : U × V → R and we define
f− , sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
f(u, v) ≤ inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
f(u, v) , f+.
We can assign to f− the meaning of a true value/saddle point for the game where v sees u and
similarly for f+. More precisely, if we denote by β the possible responses for v that sees u, i.e.
functions β : U → V then
f− = sup
u
inf
β
f(u, β(u)) = inf
β
sup
u
f(u, β(u)).
Similarly, if u sees the action of v, considering all maps α : V → U then
f+ = sup
α
inf
v∈V
f(α(v), v) = inf
v∈V
sup
α
f(α(v), v).
In the spirit of the work on dynamic games by Krasovskii-Subbotin [KS88] we call α and β above
”counter-strategies” in this static game. Obviously, the saddle points above (if they exist) are found
by solving a sequential optimization problem, i.e. finding (for f−, for example) first
β∗(u) = argmin
v
f(u, v), then u∗ = argmax
u
inf
v
f(u, v) = argmax
u
f(u, β∗(u)).
We similarly find α∗ and v∗ for f+ (if they exist, if not, we can find them approximately).
Now, the interpretation of
fp , pf− + (1− p)f+
for some 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 is that of the value of a game played by the following rules
1. a coin is tossed, with probability of H equal to p
2. if H shows up then, by the rule of the game, player v sees the control of player u
3. if T shows up, then, by the rule of the game, player u sees the control of player v.
This can also be thought of as: prior to the coin toss, player u chooses a pair (u, α) and player v
chooses a pair (v, β). Then
1. if H shows up then u is played against β
2. if T shows up, then α is played against v.
In other words, we have the quite obvious representation
fp = sup
(u,α)
inf
(v,β)
[
pf(u, β(u)) + (1− p)f(α(v), v)
]
= inf
(v,β)
sup
(u,α)
[
pf(u, β(u)) + (1− p)f(α(v), v)
]
.
In addition, the pairs (u∗, α∗) and (v∗, β∗) found above (again, if such pairs exist, if not they exist in
an approximate sense) represent a saddle point for the game with value fp. Once again, the general
dynamic game with a value vp in Subsection 2.2 will be played using this idea continuously at any
time t.
2 Set-up and main results
We now turn to the precise conditions on the state equation and pay-off, and leave the precise definition
of the probability space, as well as strategies for slightly later. We have here a differential game
with two players. The first player’s actions belong to the compact metric space (U, du) (usually
U ⊂ Rk). The second player’s actions belong also to a compact metric space (V, dv). We assume
that the state belongs to Rd (an open domain O ⊂ Rd as in [BS13] is also feasible). The coefficients
b : [0, T ]× Rd × U × V → Rd and σ : [0, T ]× Rd × U × V →Md,d′ of the state equations satisfy some
usual assumptions (see [S1ˆ4] or [S1ˆ5]).
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Assumptions on the state system: b and σ are
1. continuous on [0, T ] × Rd × U × V ,
2. uniformly locally Lipschitz in the state variable, i.e. for each K < ∞ there exists L(K) < ∞
such that
|b(t, x, u, v) − b(t, y, u, v)| + |σ(t, x, u, v) − σ(t, y, u, v)| ≤ L(K)|x− y|, ∀|x|, |y| ≤ K, ∀t, u, v,
3. have linear growth, i.e. there exists C <∞ such that
|b(t, x, u, v)| + |σ(t, x, u, v)| ≤ C(1 + |x|), ∀t, x, u, v.
In addition, we have the following
Assumption on the pay-off: the function g : Rd → R is continuous and bounded.
The state of the system is governed by equation (2), if the game starts at an initial time s at some
position x. In order to obtain the desired representation for the solution of the Isaacs-type equation
(6), we will allow, as mentioned in the introduction, for changes of rules of the game, as time evolves.
We do so by discretizing time. State discretization is also possible. For a fixed 0 ≤ s ≤ T , we will
usually denote by ∆ a time partition
s = t0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tn = T, for some n.
and by D(s) the collection of all partitions of the interval [s, T ].
2.1 Deterministic rules of priority: state-independent intermediate Hamiltonians
Fix (s, x). Assume here that the processW is a d′-dimensional Brownian motion on a fixed probability
space (Ω,F , (Ft)s≤t≤T ,P) (which can, actually, depend on (s, x)). The filtration (Ft)s≤t≤T satisfies
the usual conditions and may be larger than the natural filtration FWt , σ{Wu; s ≤ u ≤ t}∨N (P,F).
Consider now a time partition ∆ = (t0, t1, . . . , tn) ∈ D(s) of [s, T ]. Together with this partition we
have a sequence ξ = ξ1, . . . , ξn of ”marks” valued as 0 or 1. We denote by M(∆) the collection of all
possible sequence of marks (note that we have as many marks as time intervals in the partition).
The rules of the game are set, deterministically, in advance, and the players cannot change actions
in between the discrete times on ∆. If the mark ξk is equal to zero, then, on the interval [tk−1, tk] player
u first sees player v’s action, i.e player u chooses (over this time interval) some α ”counterstrategy ”
depending on
1. the whole past of the state up to tk−1
2. current value of the other players’ action
The other player only choose a strategy b depending on the past of the state, up to tk−1. In other
words, if ξk = 0 the first player u uses over [tk−1, tk] a αk(X|[0,tk−1], v) and player v uses a bk(X|[0,tk−1]).
If ξk = 1 then the roles are reversed, and player u uses a strategy ak(X|0,tk−1]) while player v uses a
counter-strategy βk(X|[0,tk−1], v). These can all me bade ”Markov” (with some special care) or general
dependent on the whole past, or may even depend, explicitly, on the actions of the opposing player
over the intervals [t0, t1], . . . [tk−1, tk−1]. The marks are deterministic, i.e. are known in advance when
the game is started. With these rules, we can define a value of the game, depending on the partition
and the marks ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn). Before that, for a fixed s, we denote by C[s, T ] the set of continuous
paths C([s, T ] : Rd). A generic path will be denoted by y or y(·). We also denote by Bt the raw
filtration generated by the paths up to time t, i.e. Bt = σ{y(u) : s ≤ u ≤ t}.
Definition 2.1 (Discrete strategies, deterministic change of rules) Fix s, together with the time
partition ∆ ∈ D(s) and the deterministic change of rules ξ ∈ M(∆).
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1. A full strategy for the player u is a sequence
u = (uk), k = 1, 2, ...n,
where
(a) if ξk = 1 then uk = ak : C[s, T ]× V
k−1 → U and
(b) if ξk = 0 then uk = αk : C[s, T ]× V
k → U .
Here, ak is Btk−1 ⊗ B(V
k−1)/B(U) measurable and αk is Btk−1 ⊗ B(V
k)/B(U) measurable. We
denote by As,∆,ξ the set of these strategies. Player u chooses the action uk at time tk−1 and
holds it until tk. This depends on the whole past of the state up to tk−1, the actions v1, . . . , vk−1
of the opponent on the intervals [t0, t1], . . . , [tk−2, tk−1] and, depending on the mark ξk on the
value vk or not.
2. A feedback strategy for the first player is a sequence
u = (uk), k = 1, 2, ...n,
where
(a) if ξk = 1 then uk = ak : C[s, T ]→ U and
(b) if ξk = 0 then uk = αk : C[s, T ]× V → U .
where ak is Btk−1/B(U) and αk is Btk−1 ⊗ B(V )/B(U) measurable. The meaning is again clear.
We denote by As,∆,ξF the set of these strategies
3. Markov strategy for the first player: the definition here is a little bit different, because we allow
for the player to change actions fewer times than the marks change. More precisely, for the fixed
∆ : t0 < . . . tn = T we assume that there is a sub-grid
s = r0 < · · · < rI(n), ri = tl(i), i = 0, . . . , I(n) ≤ n,
such that, at any of these times ri−1 = tl(i−1), the player chooses a pair (ai, αi) such that ai is
B(Rd)/B(U) and αi is B(R
d) ⊗ B(V )/B(U) measurable and holds the action decided based on
where the state is at time ri−1 = tl(i−1) until the next time on the sub-grid, i.e. ri = tl(i). The
marks may change in between ri−1 and ri but the action of player u only changes if the mark
is ξk = 0 and the action of the opponent changes. In other words, fixed the double sequence
(ai, αi)
I(n)
i=1 , the actions of player u can be represented as a strategy in item 1 (with some abuse
of notation) by
u = (uk), k = 1, 2, ...n,
where, if l(i− 1) < k ≤ l(i) then
uk(X[0,tk−1]) =
{
ai(Xtl(i−1)), ξk = 1
αi(Xtl(i−1) , ·) ξk = 0.
We denote by As,∆,ξM the set of these strategies.
We have
As,∆,ξM ⊂ A
s,∆,ξ
F ⊂ A
s,∆,ξ.
The first inclusion may not seem obvious, but, at a second glance, it is clear that dependence on older
past is OK. We define in a similar manner (but symmetrically opposite, depending on the value of the
marks) the (sets of) strategies for the player v, Bs,∆,ξM ⊂ B
s,∆,ξ
F ⊂ B
s,∆,ξ. In the definition of strategies
v the role of the value of the marks ξ is reversed, in an obvious way.
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Proposition 2.2 Fix s, x as well as ∆ ∈ D(s), ξ ∈ M(∆). Choose u ∈ As,∆,ξ, v ∈ Bs,∆,ξ. There
exists a unique strong solution of the state system (2), denoted by (Xs,x;u,vt )s≤t≤T , such that
Xt ∈ F
W
t ⊂ Ft, s ≤ t ≤ T.
Proof: the proof is done step-by-step over intervals [tk−1, tk] as in [KS88] or [S1ˆ4]. Actually, since
the initial condition is deterministic, the (uniform) linear growth condition insures that the solution
is square integrable. ⋄
With the notation J(s, x,∆, ξ;u,v) , E
[
g
(
Xs,x;u,vT
)]
, we can now define the value functions:
V −M (s, x;∆, ξ) , sup
u∈As,∆,ξ
M
inf
v∈Bs,∆,ξ
J(s, x,∆, ξ;u,v) ≤
V −(s, x;∆, ξ) , sup
u∈As,∆,ξ
inf
v∈Bs,∆,ξ
J(s, x,∆, ξ;u,v) ≤
V +(s, x;∆, ξ) , inf
v∈Bs,∆,ξ
sup
u∈As,∆,ξ
J(s, x,∆, ξ;u,v) ≤
V +M (s, x;∆, ξ) , inf
v∈Bs,∆,ξ
M
sup
u∈As,∆,ξ
J(s, x,∆, ξ;u,v).
(8)
In the chain of inequalities above we could have defined an additional intermediate layer of value func-
tions, playing Markov strategies vs. feedback strategies. Next theorem is a (deterministic) asymptotic
result, somewhat similar to [KS05], but different: time intervals are not ordered, and the actions
cannot be continuously changed in between the times on the grid. Also, we have a stochastic game
for which we find asymptotic values of inf/sup and sup/inf type.
Theorem 2.3 Assume the function p : [0, T ] → [0, 1] is continuous. For each initial time s consider
a sequence of partitions ∆n,s ∈ D(s), together with marks ξn,s ∈ M(∆n,s)) such that (∆n,s, ξn,s)
has uniform asymptotic density p. By this, we mean that for any ε > 0 there exists n0(ε) (in this
formulation we assume that n0 does not depend on s) large enough, such that for any n ≥ n0(ε) we
have that, inside the partition
∆n,s = s = t0 < t1.... < tN(n) = T,
we can find a sub-division
s = r0 < r1 < ...rI(n) = T, ri = tl(i), l(0) = 0 < l(1) < ... < l(I(n)) = N(n),
such that
ri − ri−1 ≤ ε,∀ i = 1, ..., I(n),
and ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑l(i)
k=l(i−1)+1(tk − tk−1)ξk
tl(i) − tl(i−1)
− p(tl(i−1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε, ∀ i = 1, ..., I(n) ≤ N(n).
Then the Isaacs-type equation (6) has a unique bounded continuous viscosity solution v, which is the
limit (uniform on compacts sets) of both V −M (·, ·;∆
n,·, ξn,·) and V +M (·, ·;∆
n,·, ξn,·). More precisely, for
any K <∞ and ε > 0, there exists n0 = n(K, ε) such that
∀s,∀|x| ≤ K, ∀n ≥ n0,
we have
V +M (s, x;∆
n,s, ξn,s)− ε ≤ v(s, x) ≤ V −M (s, x;∆
n,s, ξn,s) + ε. (9)
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2.2 Random rules of priority: state-dependent intermediate Hamiltonians
We study here the general case, where the players play, locally, a game with random rules described
in Subsection 1.1. Assume that the convex combination parameter is a continuous function
p : [0, T ] × Rd → [0, 1].
Fix the initial time s. The process W is a d′-dimensional Brownian motion on the fixed filtered
probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)s≤t≤TP). The filtration satisfies the usual conditions. In order to per-
form independent coin tosses, we assume that the space Ω accommodates the (infinite) sequence of
independent standard normals
η = (ηk)k=1,2,....
They are independent of the Brownian motion, and, since W comes with a possibly larger filtration,
we actually assume that, under P, the whole sequence η is independent of FT (and is i.i.d normal, as
mentioned). We denote by Φ the c.d.f. of a standard normal, so that, for each ηk above we have
P(Φ−1(ηk) ≤ λ) = λ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Fix now the initial position x. Fix, in addition, as above, a partition ∆ of the time interval. The game
is discretised in time over ∆ and the rules are decided by the realisations of the first ηi’s (as many as
time intervals). Instead of considering an infinite sequence of i.i.d. normals, one could even assume
that the probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)s≤t≤T ,P), the Brownian motion W and the first n coin tosses
η1, ...ηn actually depend on (s, x) and ∆. We could also consider directly a sequence of i.i.d. uniform
on (0, 1) instead of (Φ−1(ηk))k=1,2,....
Main rules of the game:
1. Random priority: at each time tk−1 on the grid, depending on where the state Xtk−1 is located,
a coin is tossed with probability p(tk−1,Xtk−1) and then players u, v choose their actions with
a priority rule described in the Subsection 1.1 of the Introduction. The coin toss is simulated
using the binary random variable
1{Φ−1(ηk)≤p(tk−1,Xtk−1}
,
so the value of ηk decides which player has priority over the interval [tk−1, tk].
2. No action outside the grid: the controls chosen at tk−1 have to be kept constant until the
next time on the grid, tk.
This means that, at time tk−1 player u chooses a couple (uk, αk) and player v chooses (vk, βk), as in
Subsection 1.1 of the Introduction.
1. If 1{Φ−1(ηk)≤p(tk−1,Xtk−1 )}
= 1 then uk is played against βk until tk and,
2. if 1{Φ−1(ηk≤p(tk−1,Xtk−1)} = 0 then αk is played against vk at time tk−1 and then kept constant
until tk.
The set-up of the game has to also take into account the additional (to the coin toss) information that
the two players have at time tk−1, in order to choose the two couples (uk, αk), (vk, βk). Therefore, we
need the
Additional informational structure: there are three symmetric possibilities where (both) players
1. at time tk−1 can see the whole past of the state up to that time and all controls used by the
opposing player in the past,
2. at time tk−1 can see the past of the state up to time tk−1, but not the past controls,
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3. at time tk−1 players can see only the state at time tk−1.
We use the same notation for C[s, T ] as the set of continuous paths C([s, T ] : Rd), generic paths are y
y or y(·) and Bt is the raw filtration generated by the paths up to time t, i.e. Bt = σ{y(u) : s ≤ u ≤ t}.
Definition 2.4 (Discrete strategies) Fix s and ∆ ∈ D(s) where ∆ is given as
s = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T for some n.
1. A full strategy for the first player is a sequence
u = (ak, αk), k = 1, 2, ...n,
where
ak : C[s, T ]× V
k−1 → U and αk : C[s, T ]× V
k → U
are Btk−1 ⊗B(V
k−1)/B(U) and, respectively, Btk−1 ⊗ B(V
k)/B(U) measurable.
In words, the k-th decision of player u made at time tk−1 depends on the history of the state
process up to tk−1, and history of the actions of v over intervals [t0, t1], ....[tk−2, tk−1], as well as
the k coin toss. We denote by As,∆ the set of these strategies.
2. A feedback strategy for the first player is a sequence
u = (ak, αk), k = 1, 2, ...n,
where
ak : C[s, T ]→ U and αk : C[s, T ]× V → U
are Btk−1/B(U) and, respectively, Btk−1 ⊗ B(V )/B(U) measurable. In words, this is a strategy
as above but the history of the actions of v over intervals [t0, t1], ....[tk−2, tk−1] is not taken into
account (explicitly) for the k’th decision of player u at time tk−1. We denote by A
s,∆
F the set of
these strategies
3. A Markov strategy for the first player is a sequence
u = (ak, αk), k = 1, 2, ...n,
where
ak : R
d → U and αk : R
d × V → U
are B(Rd)/B(U) and, respectively, B(Rd)⊗ B(V )/B(U) measurable.
In this case, the decision k’th of player u, made at time tk−1, depends only on the position
Xtk−1 ∈ R
d, and, depending on how the k′th toss turns up, the other opponent’s action at time
tk−1 or not. We denote by A
s,∆
M the set of these strategies.
Obviously,
As,∆M ⊂ A
s,∆
F ⊂ A
s,∆.
We define in an identical manner similar (sets of) strategies for the player v,
Bs,∆M ⊂ B
s,∆
F ⊂ B
s,∆.
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Remark 2.5 The time-discretization, together with the assumption that actions of the players are
kept constant in between the times on the grid ∆ allow for a simple definition of full strategies. In
our previous work [S1ˆ4] and [S1ˆ5], we only used the idea of feedback strategies (or counterstrategies).
However, it is well know from discrete-time game theory, that the idea of full strategy should not lead to
different value. We consider it here for completeness. From the intuition point of view, it appears also
rather clear that observing the full past of the state allows one to recover all the information needed
about the past controls of the opponent. The really important piece of information is the control of the
opponent in real time at the time of a possible change (on the grid). Modelling precisely how this is
decided randomly is the goal of the paper.
Proposition 2.6 Fix s, x,∆. Fix u ∈ As,∆, v ∈ Bs,∆. There exists a unique strong solution of the
state system (2), denoted by (Xs,x;u,vt )s≤t≤T , such that
Xt ∈ F
W
t ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk) ⊂ Ft ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk), tk−1 ≤ t ≤ tk.
Proof: the proof is based, again, on the ”step-by-step” scheme as in [KS88]. In other words, one solves
the system, iteratively over intervals [tk−1, tk], noticing that the realization of the strategies (ak, αk)
and (bk, βk) at time tk−1 are kept constant over [tk−1, tk]. The only additional thing needed is the coin
toss ηk, which is independent of W . ⋄
With the notation J(s, x;u,v) , E
[
g
(
Xs,x;u,vT
)]
, we define the value functions:
V −M (s, x;∆) , sup
u∈As,∆
M
inf
v∈Bs,∆
J(s, x;u,v) ≤ V −(s, x;∆) , sup
u∈As,∆
inf
v∈Bs,∆
J(s, x;u,v) ≤
≤ V +(s, x;∆) , inf
v∈Bs,∆
sup
u∈As,∆
J(s, x;u,v) ≤ V +M (s, x;∆) , inf
v∈Bs,∆
M
sup
u∈As,∆
J(s, x;u,v).
(10)
Again, we could have considered above an additional intermediate layer of value functions, playing
Markov strategies vs. feedback strategies.
Remark 2.7 One could prove directly that the game with discretely restricted strategies (either full,
or feedback, or Markov) has a value. In other words, we could directly show that (for the more extreme
values)
V −M (s, x;∆) = V
+
M (s, x;∆).
This would be rather long technically, and does not bring much understanding into the continuous limit
we care about, but it is certainly doable. The same goes true for the previous Subsection 2.1.
The main result of the paper, in the general case is:
Theorem 2.8 Under all standing assumptions on the state equations, together with
1. either p : [0, T ]→ [0, 1] continuous or
2. both p and σ are C2 with respect to the state variable, and the derivatives px, σx and σxx exist
and are continuous (in all variables),
the Isaacs-type equation (6) has a unique bounded continuous viscosity solution v, which is the limit
(uniform on compact sets) of both V −M (·, ·;∆) and V
+
M (·, ·;∆) as ‖∆‖ → 0. More precisely, for any
K <∞ and ε > 0, there exists a δ = δ(K, ε) such that
∀s,∀|x| ≤ K, ∀‖∆‖ ≤ δ
we have
V +M (s, x;∆)− ε ≤ v(s, x) ≤ V
−
M (s, x;∆) + ε.
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3 Proofs
As mentioned, the proofs are based on a modification of Perron’s method introduced in [S1ˆ5]. However,
the analysis has to be done separately for Subsections 2.1 and 2.2. The proofs for the random case
in Subsection 2.2 are actually easier, so we will present them more succinctly. The notations and
definitions needed for the proofs will refer to the corresponding sub-section. More precisely, we are
going to call semi-solutions two different objects in Subsection 2.1 and in Subsection 2.2.
3.1 Perron method for deterministic rule of priority
We start by defining asymptotic stochastic sub and super-solutions for the problem at hand. Before
we do that, we need to concatenate strategies (at least the simplest of them, Markov strategies).
Definition 3.1 Fix s. Let ∆ : t0 < · · · < tn ∈ D(s) and ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) ∈ M(∆). Let now v ∈ B
s,∆,ξ
M
be a Markov strategy for player v. Fix tk ∈ ∆. The time grid ∆
′ : tk < · · · < tn = T belongs to D(tk).
Consider now a Markov strategy v′ ∈ Btk,∆
′,ξ′
M where the marks ξ
′ are the restriction of the sequence
of marks ξ over the interval [tk, T ], i.e.
ξ′ = (ξi)i=k+1,...,n.
We define the concatenation of v and v′ at time tk over ∆, ξ by using v up to tk and v
′ after that. In
other words, we define
v ⊗tk v
′ = (v ⊗tk v
′
i)i=1,...,n,
where
v ⊗tk v
′
i ,
{
vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
v′i, k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Note that this fits the definition of Markov strategies, if the point tk is considered as a part of the sub-
grid (ri)i=1,...,I(n). The definitions of asymptotic sub and super-solutions below need many quantifiers,
but the intuition behind them is rather clear.
Definition 3.2 (Asymptotic super-solutions) A function w : [0, T ]×Rd → R is called an asymp-
totic super-solution for the Isaacs equation (6) if
1. it is continuous and bounded
2. satisfies w(T, x) ≥ g(x) ∀x ∈ Rd,
3. There exists a gauge function ϕw : (0,∞) → (0,∞), limεց0ϕw(ε) = 0, and a constant Cw > 0
(both possibly depending on w) such that;
∀ s ∈ [0, T ], ∆ ∈ D(s), ξ ∈ M(∆), and ∀tk ∈ ∆,
there exist measurable functions bw : R
d → V, βw : R
d × U → V with the property that (with
the notation ∆′, ξ′ as in the above lemma), the Markov strategy (for the player v starting at tk)
vˆ ∈ Btk,∆
′,ξ′
M defined by
vˆi = (bw(Xtk), βw(Xtk , u), i = k + 1, . . . , n,
has the property that, ∀u ∈ As,∆,ξ, ∀v ∈ Bs,∆,ξM , ∀k ≤ l ≤ n we have
w(tk,X
s,x,u,v
tk
) ≥E[w(tl,X
s,x,u,v⊗tk vˆ
tl
)|Ftk ]
−(tl − tk)
(
ϕw(tl − tk) + Cw
∣∣∣∣∣
∑l
i=k+1(ti − ti−1)ξi
tl − tk
− p(tk)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
.
(11)
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Denote by U the class of asymptotic super-solutions. Comparing this to the definition of Markov
strategies, we see that (bw, βw) are chosen at tk and not changed until tn. Only the marks change after
tk.
Lemma 3.3 Given w ∈ U , if (∆n,s, ξn,s) has uniform asymptotic density p (see the statement of
Theorem 2.3), then
w(s, x) ≥ lim sup
n
V +M (s, x;∆
n,s, ξn,s)
uniformly in (s, x). More precisely, for any ε > 0 there exists n0(ε) such that
V +M (s, x;∆
n,s, ξn,s)− ε ≤ w(s, x), ∀ n ≥ n0(ε), ∀s, x. (12)
Proof: Fix the initial conditions s, x and ε > 0. For n ≥ n0(ε) we have that, inside the partition
∆n,s = s = t0 < t1.... < tN(n) = T,
we can find a sub-division
s = r0 < r1 < ...rI(n) = T, ri = tl(i), l(0) = 0 < l(1) < ... < l(I(n))) = N(n),
such that
ϕ(ri − ri−1) ≤ ε, i = 1, ..., I(N),
and ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑l(i)
k=l(i−1)+1(tk − tk−1)ξk
tl(i) − tl(i−1)
− p(tl(i−1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Using the definition of super-solution recursively for times tk = tl(i−1) = ri−1, i = 1, . . . , I(n)) on the
sub-grid, we construct a vˆ from time s to time T by concatenating the constant strategies (biw, β
i
w)
(corresponding to time ri−1) over the interval [ri−1, ri] = [tl(i−1), tl(i)] (remember marks may change
over this interval) such that, in the end,
vˆl =
{
βiw(X|[s,ri−1], u), ξl = 1,
biw(X|[s,ri−1]), ξl = 0
l = l(i− 1) + 1, ..., l(i).
Note that the strategy vˆ is a Markov strategy. Implementing this strategy vˆ against any strategy
u of the player u yields, according to the very definition of super-solution applied, successively, for
i = 1, ....I(n) to the inequalities
w(ri−1,X
s,x,u,vˆ
ri−1 ) ≥E[w(ri,X
s,x,u,vˆ
ri )|Fri−1 ]−
−(ri − ri−1)

ϕ(ri − ri−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸≤ε +C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑l(i)
k=l(i−1)+1(tk − tk−1)ξk
ri − ri−1
− p(ri−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ε

 .
Since w(T, x) ≥ g(x), we conclude that
w(s, x) ≥ E[g(Xs,x,u,vˆT )]− (T − s)(1 + C)ε,
for all u, if n ≥ n0(ε), finishing the proof of the lemma. ♦
The proof of the next lemma is not obvious but its proof is very similar to the corresponding result
in [S1ˆ5].
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Lemma 3.4 The set of asymptotic super-solutions is closed under minimum, i.e.
v,w ∈ U → v ∧ w ∈ U .
Next proposition is the main technical result of the section. Before it is presented, notice the obvious
fact that U 6= ∅, because the cost function g is bounded.
Proposition 3.5 Define
v+ , inf
w∈U
w ≥ lim sup
n
V +M (s, x;∆
n, ξn).
Then v+ is a USC viscosity sub-solution of the Isaacs equation (6).
Proof: To begin with, we use [BS12, Proposition 4.1] together with the previous Lemma 3.4 above
to conclude that there exist a countable sequence wn ∈ U such that wn ց v
+. We need to treat
separately the (parabolic) interior viscosity sub-solution property for v+ and the terminal condition
v+(T, ·) ≤ g (which is, actually, a equality).
1. Interior sub-solution property: Consider a smooth function ψ which touches v+ locally
strictly above at some (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T )× R
d. Assume, by contradiction, that
ψt(t0, x0) +H
p(t0, x0, ψx(t0, x0), ψxx(t0, x0)) < −ε for some ε > 0.
With the notation
Lt,x,u,vv = b(t, x, u, v) · vx(t, x) +
1
2
Tr
(
σ(t, x, u, v)σ(t, x, u, v)T vxx(t, x)
)
,
this means that there exists a bˆ ∈ V as well as βˆ : U → V such that
ψt(t0, x0) + p(t0) sup
u∈U
Lt0,x0,u,βˆ(u)ψ + (1− p(t0)) sup
u∈U
Lt0,x0,u,bˆψ < −ε.
We make the additional notation
pˆ , ψt(t0, x0) + sup
u∈U
Lt0,x0,u,βˆ(u)ψ, qˆ , ψt(t0) + sup
u∈U
Lt0,x0,u,bˆ,
and use continuity of p to consider an even smaller ε > 0 such that
p(t)(pˆ + ε) + (1− p(t))(qˆ + ε) ≤ −ε, |t− t0| ≤ 2ε.
We use continuity once again to find some ε′ > 0 depending on ε such that
ψt(t, x) + sup
u∈U
Lt,x,u,βˆ(u)ψ ≤ pˆ+ ε, ψt(t, x) + sup
u∈U
Lt0,x0,u,bˆψ ≤ qˆ + ε, |t− t0| ∨ |x− x0| ≤ 2ε
′.
Since ψ touches locally v+ strictly above, ψ s continuous and v+ is USC, we can find an even
smaller ε′ > 0 and a δ > 0 small enough such that
ψ(t, x)− v+(t, x) ≥ 2δ for ε′ ≤ |t− t0| ∨ |x− x0| ≤ 2ε
′.
Now, a Dini type argument, identical to the one used in [BS14] and [BS13] implies that, for some
n large enough we actually have
ψ(t, x)− wn(t, x) ≥ δ for ε
′ ≤ |t− t0| ∨ |x− x0| ≤ 2ε
′. (13)
Now let η < δ and define
w(t, x) ,
{
(ψ(t, x) − η) ∧ wn(t, x), |t− t0| ∨ |x− x0| ≤ 2ε
′
wn(t, x), |t− t0| ∨ |x− x0| > 2ε
′.
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Using (21) we see that w(t, x) = wn(t, x) for |t−t0|+|x−x0| ≥ ε
′ and w is continuous everywhere.
On top, w(t0, x0) = v
+(t0, x0) − η, so we have a contradiction if we can prove that w ∈ U . In
order to do this, fix 0 ≤ s ≤ T , a ∆ ∈ D(s) and some tk ∈ ∆. For this time tk, we define
bw : R
d → V and βw : R
d × U → V by
bw(x) =
{
bwn(x), wn(tk, x) ≤ ψ(tk, x)− η,
bˆ, wn(tk, x) > ψ(tk, x)− η,
as well as
βw(x, u) =
{
βwn(x, u), wn(tk, x) ≤ ψ(tk, x)− η,
βˆ(u), wn(tk, x) > ψ(tk, x)− η.
For any fixed sequence of marks ξ ∈ M(∆), fix a u ∈ As,∆,ξ. Denote by
Xˆ· , X
s,x,u,vˆ
· .
Now, the proof goes very similarly to the proof in [S1ˆ5]. Recall that we have to make all estimates at
time tk. On the event where the the initial condition where wn lies below ψ − η at time tk,
Ac = {wn(tk, Xˆtk ) ≤ ψ(tk, Xˆtk)− η} ∈ Ftk
equation (11) is satisfied with ϕ = ϕwn and C = Cwn , i.e. for any later tl ∈ ∆, tk < tl we have
1Acw(tk, Xˆtk) = 1Acwn(tk, Xˆtk ) ≥
≥1AcE[wn(tl, Xˆtl)|Ftk ]− 1Ac(tl − tk)
(
ϕwn(tl − tk) + Cwn
∣∣∣∣∣
∑l
i=k+1(ti − ti−1)ξi
tl − tk
− p(tk)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≥1AcE[w(tl,X
r,ξ,u,vˆ
tl
)|Ftk ]− 1Ac(tl − tk)
(
ϕwn(tl − tk) + Cwn
∣∣∣∣∣
∑l
i=k+1(ti − ti−1)ξi
tl − tk
− p(tk)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
.
(14)
For the other possibilities, i.e. over the event
A = {wn(tk, Xˆtk) > ψ(tk, Xˆtk )− η}
we have, with the additional notation
B = {|Xˆt − x0| ≤ 2ε
′ ∀tk ≤ t ≤ tl},
that
1AP(B
c|Ftk ) ≤ 1A(tl − tk)ϕ(tl − tk) a.s., (15)
uniformly (over all u and all else that matters), for some gauge function ϕ. The proof is similar
to [S1ˆ5]. On the other hand, over A we can apply Itoˆ. On this event, for any subinterval [ti−1, ti]
(i = k + 1, . . . , l) we have 2 possible cases:
1. either ξi = 1, in which case we use the strategy of u against the counterstrategy βˆ
2. or ξi = 0, when we use a counterstrategy for u agains the constant bˆ. After Itoˆ and taking
conditional expectation, we get,
1Aw(tk, Xˆtk) =1A(ψ(tk, Xˆtk )− η) = 1AE[ψ(tl, Xˆtl)− η|Ftk ]− 1AΣ
l
i=k+1E[
∫ ti
ti−1
L(ψ − η)dτ |Fr ]
≥1AE[1Bw(tl, Xˆtl)|Ftk ]
+1AE[1Bcψ(tl, Xˆtl)− η|Ftk ]− 1AΣ
l
i=k+1E[
∫ ti
ti−1
L(ψ − η)dτ |Ftk ]
=1AE[w(tl, Xˆtl)|Ftk ]
+1AE[1Bc
(
ψ(tl, Xˆtl)− η − w(tl, Xˆtl)
)
|Ftk ]− 1AΣ
l
i=k+1E[
∫ ti
ti−1
L(ψ − η)dτ |Ftk ].
(16)
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On A ∩B we have estimates on the generator L, so
1AΣ
l
i=k+1E[1B
∫ ti
ti−1
L(ψ − η)dτ |Ftk ]1 ≤ 1A Σ
l
i=k+1(ti − ti−1){(pˆ + ε)1{ξi=1} + (qˆ + ε)1{ξi=0}}︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
.
Now, we have to work with the last sum term
S =(tl − tk)×
{
(pˆ + ε)Σli=k+1
ti − ti−1
tl − tk
1{ξi=1} + (qˆ + ε)Σ
l
i=k+1
ti − ti−1
tl − tk
1{ξi=0}
}
=(tl − tk)× {(pˆ+ ε)p(tk) + (qˆ + ε)(1 − p(tk))}︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+(tl − tk)×
{
(pˆ + ε)
(
Σli=k+1
ti − ti−1
tl − tk
1{ξi=1} − p(tk)
)
+ (qˆ + ε)
(
Σli=k+1
ti − ti−1
tl − tk
1{ξi=0} − q(tk)
)}
.
Therefore,
S ≤ (tl − tk)× (|pˆ+ ε|+ |qˆ + ε|)×
∣∣∣∣Σli=k+1 ti − ti−1tl − tk 1{ξi=1} − p(tk)
∣∣∣∣ .
On the other hand
−1AE[1Bc
(
ψ(tl, Xˆtl)− η − w(tl, Xˆtl)
)
|Ftk ] ≤ 1AC(tl − tk)ϕ(tl − tk),
and
1AΣ
l
i=k+1E[1Bc
∫ ti
ti−1
L(ψ − η)dτ |Ftk ] ≤ 1AC(tl − tk)
2ϕ(tl − tk) ≤ 1ACT (tl − tk)ϕ(tl − tk),
where C is a uniform bound on ψ − η−w and L(ψ− η). Such bound exists, if, for example, we
make ψ have compact support. This is fine, since we assumed ψ to touch v+ above strictly only
in a local sense. We now finish the proof by choosing
ϕw = ϕwn ∨ C(1 + T )ϕ, Cw = Cwn ∨
(
|pˆ+ ε|+ |qˆ + ε|
)
.
3. The terminal condition: v+(T, ·) ≤ g(·) The proof is very similar to the construction for the
terminal condition proof in [S1ˆ5] but with the exact modifications present in item 1 above. More
precisely, once the terminal condition is assumed, by contradiction, to be violated, we use an
identical analytic construction around the exceptional point x0 such that v
+(T, x0) > g(x0) to
the analytic construction in [S1ˆ5]. The remainder of the proof is then based on two very similar
estimates to (14) and (16) as above to finish the proof.
Remark 3.6 Obviously, we need to formulate precise counterparts to Definition 3.2 to define the class
of asymptotic sub-solutions L and prove a counter-part to Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4. In addition,
we construct,, as a counterpart to Proposition 3.5 for super-solutions the LSC viscosity sub-solution
of the Isaacs equation (6)
v− = sup
w∈L
w,
such that v− ≤ v+.
The proof of Theorem 2.3 is complete once we realise that
15
1. v− = v+ = v the continuous viscosity solution to the Isaacs equation (6). This is the consequence
of a comparison result whose proof is identical to the result in [S1ˆ4] (first a reduction to a bounded
comparison result, then a limit) once we observe that the (time dependent) linear combination
Hp(t, x, p,M) = p(t)H−(t, x, p,M) + (1− p(t))H+(t, x, p,M),
satisfies (locally in x) the structural condition (3.14) in [CIL92], needed for comparison. Note
that both Hamiltonians H− and H+ satisfy such condition (this is proved in [CIL92, page 19])
and overviewed in [S1ˆ4]. One has to take care of the appropriate sign for H to get exactly
condition (3.14) in [CIL92].
2. we can extract a sequence wn ց v ∈ U and, therefore, by Dini’s criterion (since wn and v are
continuous) we have that the convergence is uniform on compacts.
3. we can make an identical argument for sub-solutions vn ր v uniform on compacts,
4. we use relation (12) for a super-solution wn, and its counterpart for a sub-solution vn such that
wn and vn are close apart on compacts (from item 2, 3 above, such exist) to obtain the conclusion
(9).
3.2 Perron method for random rules of priority
We basically have to re-define all objects in Subsection 3.1 and go over similar proofs. The arguments
will, therefore, be a bit repetitive. For this reason, we present them in less detail. However, care must
be taken to account for the randomisation of rules of priority. All notation is considered in the context
of the model in Subsection 2.2.
Definition 3.7 (Asymptotic super-solutions, random rules) A function w : [0, T ]×Rd → R is
called an asymptotic super-solution for the Isaacs equation (6) if
1. it is continuous and bounded
2. satisfies w(T, x) ≥ g(x) ∀x ∈ Rd,
3. there exist a gauge function ϕw : (0,∞)→ (0,∞), possibly depending on w, with limεց0ϕw(ε) =
0, such that ∀s ∈ [0, T ] and ∀s ≤ r ≤ T there exist measurable functions
bˆw : R
d → V, βˆw : R
d × U → V
such that the Markov strategy for the v player defined by vˆ = v(r) = (bˆw, βˆw) played at time r
and kept constant until T against any u = (a, α) and following any prior strategy v up to time
r has an asymptotic super-martingale property (until the next time on the grid).
More precisely, ∀∆ ∈ D(s) such that r = tk ∈ ∆, for any v ∈ B
s,∆
M and any u ∈ A
s,∆, if we
make the notation Xˆ· , X
s,x,u,v⊗tk vˆ
· , then the ”local asymptotic super-martingale property”
(tk, Xˆtk) ≥ E[w(tk+1, Xˆtk+1)|Ftk ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk)]− (tk+1 − tk)ϕw(tk+1 − tk) (17)
holds.
Denote by U the class of asymptotic super-solutions.
In the definition above we implicitly used a rather obvious notation for the concatenation of Markov
strategies.
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Remark 3.8 We recall that the priority rule at time r = tk is decided by the coin toss ηk+1 and
actions are kept constant up to tk+1. At time tk, after the coin is tossed, the actions of both players
are decided and kept constant until time tk+1. Therefore, the process Xˆ satisfies the integral equation
Xˆt = Xˆtk + 1{Φ−1(ηk+1≤p(tk ,Xˆtk )}
[∫ t
tk
b(τ, Xˆτ , ak+1(Xˆ·), βˆ(Xˆtk , ak+1(Xˆ·)))dτ
+
∫ t
tk
σ(τ, Xˆτ , ak+1(Xˆ·), βˆ(Xˆtk , ak+1(Xˆ·)))dWτ
]
+1{Φ−1(ηk+1>p(tk ,Xˆtk )}
[∫ t
tk
b(τ, Xˆτ , αk+1(Xˆ·, bˆ(Xˆtk)), bˆ(Xˆtk )))dτ
+
∫ t
tk
σ(τ, Xˆτ , αk+1(Xˆ·, bˆ(Xˆtk)), bˆ(Xˆtk )))dWτ
]
, tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1,
Abusing notation we say that
Xˆt = 1{Φ−1(ηk+1≤p(tk,Xˆtk )}
X
tk ,Xˆtk ,ak+1,βˆ
t + 1{Φ−1(ηk+1>p(tk,Xˆtk )}
X
tk ,Xˆtk ,αk+1,bˆ
t ∈ Ft ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk+1),
for tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1. Taking the expectation with respect tot the coin toss ηk+1, the ”local asymptotic
super-martingale property”, written in between consecutive times tk and tk+1 becomes
w(tk, Xˆtk ) ≥p(tk, Xˆtk)E[w(tk+1,X
tk ,Xˆtk ,ak+1,βˆ
tk+1
)|Ftk ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk)]
+(1− p(tk, Xˆtk ))E[w(tk+1,X
tk ,Xˆtk ,αk+1,bˆ
tk+1
|Ftk ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk)]− (tk+1 − tk)ϕw(tk+1 − tk).
(18)
We prefer to average out the coin toss ηk+1 because, since can write Itoˆ formula and identify easy the
generator.
Lemma 3.9 Let w ∈ U . Then
w(s, x) ≥ lim sup
‖∆|→0
V +M (s, x;∆)
uniformly in (s, x). More precisely, for any ε > 0 there exists δ0(ε) such that
V +M (s, x;∆, ξ)− ε ≤ w(s, x), ∀ ∆ ∈ D(s), ‖∆‖ ≤ δ0(ε), ∀s, x. (19)
Proof: The proof is actually easier for this case, compared to Subsection 3.1, and very much similar
to [S1ˆ5]. Fix s, x. Fix ε > 0. For some δ0(ε) we have T × ϕw(δ) ≤ ε for δ ≤ δ0(ε). Fix a partition
such that ‖∆‖ ≤ δ0(ε). We use the definition of asymptotic super-solution to construct, recursively,
over [tk, tk+1] the bˆk+1, βˆk+1 the strategy for player v
vˆ = (bˆk, βˆk), k = 1, . . . , n.
Use this strategy vˆ against any strategy u of the player u and keep the notation Xˆ for the resulting
state process. Iterating (17) for tk = t0, t1, . . . , tn−1 and applying it to up to tk+1 = t1, t2, . . . , tn we
obtain
w(tk, Xˆtk) ≥ E[w(tk+1, Xˆtk+1)|Ftk ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk)]− (tk+1 − tk)ϕw(tk+1 − tk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ε/T
.
Summing the telescoping terms, since w(T, x) ≥ g(x), we conclude that w(s, x) ≥ E[g(Xs,x,u,vˆT )] − ε.
♦
The proof of the next lemma is again very similar to a corresponding result in [S1ˆ5].
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Lemma 3.10 The set of asymptotic super-solutions with random rules is closed under minimum, i.e.
v,w ∈ U → v ∧ w ∈ U .
Again, U 6= ∅, because the cost function g is bounded.
Proposition 3.11 Define
v+ , inf
w∈U
w ≥ lim sup
‖∆‖→0
V +M (s, x;∆).
Then v+ is a USC viscosity sub-solution of the Isaacs equation (6).
Proof: Use [BS12, Proposition 4.1] and Lemma 3.10 to find a sequence wn ∈ U such that wn ց v
+.
We again treat separately the (parabolic) interior viscosity sub-solution property for v+ and the
terminal condition v+(T, ·) ≤ g (equality).
1. Interior sub-solution property: Consider a smooth function ψ which touches locally v+
strictly above at some (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T )× R
d, and assume that
ψt(t0, x0) +H
p(t0, x0, ψx(t0, x0), ψxx(t0, x0)) < −ε for some ε > 0.
With the same notation for Lt,x,u,v, this means that there exists a bˆ ∈ V as well as βˆ : U → V
such that
ψt(t0, x0) + p(t0, x0) sup
u∈U
Lt0,x0,u,βˆ(u)ψ + (1− p(t0, x0)) sup
u∈U
Lt0,x0,u,bˆψ < −ε.
Now we use continuity to find some smaller ε > 0 such that
p(r, y)
(
ψt(t, x) + sup
u∈U
Lt,x,u,βˆ(u)ψ
)
+ (1− p(r, y))
(
ψt(t
′, x′) + sup
u∈U
Lt
′,x′,u,bˆψ
)
< −ε, (20)
∀|t− t0|, |x− x0|, |r− t0|, |t
′ − t0|, |x
′ − x0| ≤ 2ε. Since the function ψ touches locally v
+ strictly
above, ψ is continuous and v+ is USC, we can find an even smaller ε > 0 and a δ > 0 small
enough such that
ψ(t, x) − v+(t, x) ≥ 2δ for ε ≤ |t− t0| ∨ |x− x0| ≤ 2ε.
The same Dini type argument, implies that, for some n large enough we actually have
ψ(t, x)− wn(t, x) ≥ δ for ε
′ ≤ |t− t0| ∨ |x− x0| ≤ 2ε
′. (21)
Fix η < δ and define
w(t, x) ,
{
(ψ(t, x) − η) ∧ wn(t, x), |t− t0| ∨ |x− x0| ≤ 2ε
′
wn(t, x), |t− t0| ∨ |x− x0| > 2ε
′.
Using (21) we see that w(t, x) = wn(t, x) for |t−t0|∨|x−x0| ≥ ε
′ and w is continuous everywhere.
Since w(t0, x0) = v
+(t0, x0)− η we have a contradiction if we can prove that w ∈ U . We do so
next. For the continuous function w, for a fixed s and any s ≤ r ≤ T define bw : R
d → V and
βw : R
d × U → V by
bw(x) =
{
bwn(x), wn(r, x) ≤ ψ(t, x)− η,
bˆ, wn(r, x) > ψ(t, x)− η,
as well as
βw(x, u) =
{
βwn(x, u), wn(r, x) ≤ ψ(t, x) − η,
βˆ(u), wn(r, x) > ψ(t, x) − η.
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Fix s ≤ r ≤ T . Fix also some ∆ ∈ D(s) such that r = tk ∈ ∆ for some k. Fix any u ∈ A
s,∆ and any
v ∈ Bs,∆M . From here on we use all the notations that one would use to write the Definition (3.7) of
for the (potential) super-solution w. If wn lies below ψ − η at time tk = r i.e. on
Ac = {wn(tk, Xˆtk ≤ ψ(tk, Xˆtk )− η} ∈ Fr ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk)
equation (17) is satisfied with ϕ = ϕwn
1Acw(tk, Xˆtk) =1Acwn(tk, Xˆtk)
≥1AcE[wn(tk+1, Xˆtk+1)|Ftk ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk)]− 1Ac(tk+1 − tk)ϕwn(tk+1 − tk)
≥1AcE[w(tk+1, Xˆtk+1)|Ftk ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk)]− 1Ac(tk+1 − tk)ϕwn(tk+1 − tk).
(22)
On the event A = {wn(tk, Xˆtk ) > ψ(tk, Xˆtk)− η}, with the additional notation
B = {|Xˆt − x0| ≤ 2ε ∀r = tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1},
we can estimate
1AP(B
c|Ftk ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk)) ≤ 1A(tk+1 − tk)ϕ(tk+1 − tk) a.s., (23)
uniformly over all u, for some gauge function ϕ; cf. [S1ˆ5]. On the set A we can apply Itoˆ’s formula,
separately for the two possibilities for the coin toss at time r = tk explicitly represented in Remark
3.8.
1. either Φ−1(ηk+1) ≤ p(tk, Xˆtk ), in which case we use the strategy of u = ak+1 against the
counterstrategy βˆ
2. or Φ−1(ηk+1) > tk, Xˆtk ), when we use a counterstrategy for u = αk+1 agains the constant bˆ. Itoˆ
and conditional expectation yields, with the abuse of notation
ak+1 = ak+1(Xˆ·), βˆ = βˆ(ak+1(Xˆ·)), αk+1 = αk+1(Xˆ·, bˆ),
and the additional simplifying notation
Gk , Ftk ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk), ψη , ψ − η,
1Aw(tk, Xˆtk) = 1Aψη(tk, Xˆtk ) =
= 1AE
[
1{Φ−1(ηk+1)≤p(tk ,Xˆtk)}
(
ψη(tk+1, Xˆtk+1)−
∫ tk+1
tk
Lτ,Xˆτ ,ak+1,βˆψηdτ
)
|Gk
]
+ 1AE
[
1{Φ−1(ηk+1>p(tk,Xˆtk )}
(
ψη(tk+1, Xˆtk+1)−
∫ tk+1
tk
Lτ,X
r,Xˆτ ,αk+1,bˆψηdτ
)
|Gk
]
≥ 1AE[1Bw(tk, Xˆtk )|Gk] + 1AE[1Bcψη(tk, Xˆtk)|Gk]−
− 1A E
[
p(tk, Xˆtk )
∫ tk+1
tk
Lτ,Xˆτ ,ak+1,βˆψηdτ + (1− p(tk, Xˆtk))
∫ tk+1
tk
Lτ,X
r,Xˆτ ,αk+1,bˆψηdτ |Gk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
.
(24)
On the event A ∩ B we have estimates (20) on the generator L, and also on the probability
(conditional) of Bc so
1AS ≤ 0 + CP[B
c|Ftk ∨ σ(η1, . . . , ηk)] ≤ 1A(tk+1 − tk)ϕ(tk+1 − tk).
On the other hand
−1AE[1Bc
(
ψη(tk+1, Xˆtk+1)− w((tk+1, Xˆtk+1)
)
|Ftk∨σ(η1, . . . , ηk)] ≤ 1AC(tk+1−tk)−ϕ(tk+1−tk),
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where C is a uniform bound on ψη −w and Lψη (such bound exists, if, for example, we make ψ
have compact support by multiplication. This is clearly possible since we assume ψ touches v+
above locally strictly.) We now finish the proof by choosing
ϕw = ϕwn ∨ C(1 + T )ϕ.
3. The terminal condition v+(T, ·) ≤ g(·). The proof is exactly as in the counterpart from
Subsection 2.1, similar to the construction for the terminal condition, but with the exact modi-
fications present in item 1 above, namely similar estimates to (22) and (24) are obtained.
Remark 3.12 We again formulate precise counterparts to Definition 3.7 to define the class of asymp-
totic sub-solutions L and prove a counter-part to Lemma 3.9 and Lemma 3.10. In addition, we con-
struct,, as a counterpart to Proposition 3.11 for super-solutions the LSC viscosity sub-solution of the
Isaacs equation (6)
v− = sup
w∈L
w,
such that v− ≤ v+.
The proof of Theorem 2.8 (in a similar way to Theorem 2.3) is complete after we show that
1. v− = v+ = v, the continuous viscosity solution to the Isaacs equation (6). This is, again, the
consequence of a comparison result whose proof is identical to the result in [S1ˆ4]. However,
one has to pay special attention to checking (locally in space) the structural condition (3.14) in
[CIL92] for the Hamiltonian
Hp((t, x, p,M) = p(t, x)H−(t, x, p,M) + (1− p(t, x))H+(t, x, p,M).
For the case when p depends on time only, this is all the same as in the proof related to the
previous Subsection 2.1. However, for the case when p depends on (t, x) this is a bit more com-
plicated. We remind the reader, for completeness, that the structural condition (3.14) (localized
in space) in [CIL92] reads, as:
∀K <∞, ∃ ωK : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) ωk(0+) = 0, such that
H(t, x, α(x − y),X) −H(t, y, α(x− y), Y ) ≤ ωK(α|x − y|
2 + |x− y|), (25)
for all |x|, |y| ≤ K, t ∈ [0, T ] and X,Y such that
− 3α
(
I 0
0 I
)
≤
(
X 0
0 −Y
)
≤ 3α
(
I −I
−I I
)
. (26)
To begin with, we see that,
x→ p(t, x)b(t, x, u, v)
is a locally (in state) Lipschitz map, uniformly in (t, u, v). Therefore, the arguments in [CIL92]
page 19 ensure that
G(t, x, u, v, p,M) , p(t, x)b(t, x, u, v) · p, G′(t, x, u, v, p,M) , (1− p(t, x))b(t, x, u, v) · p
satisfy (25) subject to (26) uniformly in (t, u, v) (locally in x). In addition, the map
x→ p(t, x)σ(t, x, u, v)σT (t, x, u, v) ≥ I × 0
as a matrix-valued function is inW 2,∞(BK), where BK = {x ∈ R
d||x| ≤ K}, uniformly in t, u, v.
Theorem 5.2.3 page 132 in [SV06] yields that
x→
√
p(t, x)σ(t, x, u, v)σT (t, x, u, v) and x→
√
(1− p(t, x))σ(t, x, u, v)σT (t, x, u, v)
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are (matrix valued maps) locally Lipschitz in x, uniformly in (t, u, v). Following the arguments
on page 19 in [CIL92] we obtain that the ”Hamiltonians”
E(t, x, u, v, p,M) ,
1
2
Tr(p(t, x)σ(t, x, u, v)σT (t, x, u, v)M),
E′(t, x, u, v, p,M) ,
1
2
Tr((1− p(t, x))σ(t, x, u, v)σT (t, x, u, v)M),
satisfy (25) subject to (26) (locally in x), and all estimates are uniform in (t, u, v). Following
the comments on last part of page 19 in [CIL92], our Hamiltonian
Hp(t, x, p,M) = sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
{
G(t, x, u, v, p,M) + E(t, x, u, v, p,M)
}
+ inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
{
G′(t, x, u, v, p,M) + E′(t, x, u, v, p,M)
}
also satisfies (25) subject to (26), for |x|, |y| ≤ K.
2. we can extract a sequence wn ց v ∈ U and, therefore, by Dini’s criterion (since wn and v are
continuous) we have that the convergence is uniform on compacts.
3. we can make an identical argument for sub-solutions vn ր v uniform on compacts,
4. we use relation (12) for a super-solution wn, and its counterpart for a sub-solution vn such that
wn and vn are close apart on compacts (from item 2, 3 above, such exist) to obtain the conclusion
(9).
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